This article discusses the impact of host government policy inconsistency on multinational corporations' relationships with local suppliers that benefit from public funding. Empirical findings suggest that such relationships suffer from transactions cost disadvantages, due to concerns that unexpected losses of funding may cause the suppliers to demand new contracts. The findings reflect statistical tests on a structural equation, latent variable model using data from a survey of 111 aIXliates of MNCs operating in 36 countries.
Introduction
This study examines some effects of government policy inconsistency on the organization of multinational corporations (MNCs) and their external supply networks. Many states have implemented policies to own, subsidize, finance, guarantee financing, or provide preferences to fund domestic firms that supply intermediate or final goods to international firms [See Evans (1979) ; Duvall and Freeman (1981) ]. These policies generally aim to entice foreign direct investment or to bend MNCs' operations to various national objectives.
They may also seek to promote technology transfer, while reserving learning and profit opportunities in countries' international economic sectors for local interests. Some local firms may use these incentives to enter international markets, in effect renting their customers' global networks [Kogut (1983, p. 51) ].
While publicly-funded supply incentives provide potential production cost savings to MNCs, state participation often increases their managers' perceptions of uncertainty.
No matter how generous or apparently free-of-strings, these indirect subsidies create a Trojan horse of external dependence.
As Roddewyn (1988: 343) put it, 'What governments give, they can also take away, since they are sovereign. ' Supplier relationships that depend on governments' policies suffer from at least two sources of uncertainty, beside those common to all contractual relationships.
First See Schelling (1960; Williamson (1983 Williamson ( , 1985 ]. 
x=A,(+6,
where nY and /1, are matrices of parameters and E and 6 are vectors of measurement errors. Eqs. (2) (Dunning, 1988 Yll=Blt/2-YlSl+il~ The yi pertain to questionnaire data. The formula given respondents to guide estimation of external sourcing (qr) was ment funding or a type of asset specificity did not figure in the relationships, respondents scored items zero. If both figured, items were scored from 1 (not important) to 4 (often critical). Items were y, adjacent facilities (site-specificity). y, orders comprising the entire annual output of certain facilities (dedicated asset specificity). y, manufacturing personnel's experience using your products (human asset specificity). y, government job-training programs or credits aimed at processes that make or use the goods traded (human asset specificity). Industrial market economies: Australia (5) Belgium (4) Canada (3) Denmark (I) France (3) Germany (8) Ireland (1) Italy (4) Japan (5) Luxembourg (I) Netherlands (3) New Zealand (4) Spain (6) Sweden (3) Switzerland (2) United Kingdom (10) USA (6) tipper middle income ecnnomirs: Argentina (3) Brazil (7) Chile (1) Hong Kong (2) Korea (2) Mexico ( 
Latent variable reliability
After completing the survey, I chose sets of indicators for each latent variable from the questionnaire, in accordance with prior intention and ex post inspection of the survey data. These were submitted to confirmatory factor analysis, to establish their reliabilities as measures. Reliability, in this context, refers to the ratio of common to overall variance in a set of indicators, explained by an hypothesized underlying common factor. Levels of 0.6 or above meet conventional standards [Bagozzi and Yi (1988) ].9 Reliabilities are 0.732, 0.832 and 0.927, respectively for the indicators chosen for yap, qj and tl.
Parameter estimation and results
The combined structural equation and measurement model parameters were estimated using a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) computational procedure."' Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the last of two rounds of estimation.
In the first round, no zero restrictions were imposed on the exogenous variables' coefficient matrix. This procedure uncovered several unpredicted significant (at p 5 0. IO) relationships among the structural equation variables. The second round estimated the model presented in section 2, augmented to include the significant relationships uncovered in round one." Table 3 presents the structural  equation  parameter estimates, t tests of significance and the chi-square test of overall model goodness-of-fit. Table 2 ' Bagozzi (1980, pp. 176-183) 
Measures of over-all goodness-of-fit
Chi-squared (86 d.f.) = 93.09 Probability level =0.282 Goodness-of-tit index = 0.905 Adjusted goodness-of-tit index = 0.664 Root mean square residual = 0.058 Total coefficient of determination for structural equations=0.515 "t-values are shown under parameter estimates. *Significant at the p ~0.10 level, two-tailed. **Significant at the pjO.05 level, two-tailed. ***Significant at the psO.01 level, two-tailed.
positive and significant. Unambiguous support emerged for the expected negative relationship between perceived government policy consistency and importance of state-funded suppliers' transaction specific assets (HZ on fi2 in eq. (5); t = -4.124, p 50.01). Transaction specific assets also proved positive and significant at ~50.10 in the external sourcing equation (H3 on pi in eq. (4)). The control variable, firm-specific cost advantage displayed the expected negative sign, and was significant at p 5 0.05.
The country political organizational variables, single party dominance and GDP per capita performed as expected in eq. (6) Overall goodness-of-fit statistics, on balance, favor accepting the model as adequate. The chi-square value of 93.09, 86 degrees of freedom, suggests that the data fail to reject the model at a probability level of 0.28. Root mean square residual was 0.058, and Joreskog and Sorbom's adjusted goodness-oftit ratio was 0.664. These last two results fall short of conservative ideals of 0.05 and 'about 0.9,' [Bagozzi and Yi (1988) 
